Many machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. It has been observed that adding adversarial perturbations that are imperceptible to humans can make machine learning models produce wrong predictions with high confidence. Although there has been a lot of recent effort dedicated to learning models that are adversarially robust, this remains an open problem. In particular, it has been empirically observed that although using adversarial training can effectively reduce the adversarial classification error on the training dataset, the learned model cannot generalize well to the test data. Moreover, we lack a theoretical understanding of the generalization property of machine learning models in the adversarial setting.
Introduction
In recent years, many modern machine learning models, in particular, deep neural networks, have achieved success in tasks such as image classification [31, 25] , speech recognition [23] , machine translation [5] , game playing [45] , etc. However, although these models achieve the state-of-the-art performance in many standard benchmarks or competitions, it has been observed that by adversarially adding some perturbation to the input of the model (images, audio signals), the machine learning models can make wrong predictions with high confidence. These adversarial inputs are often called the adversarial examples. Typical methods of generating adversarial examples include adding small perturbations that are imperceptible to humans [48] , changing surrounding areas of the main objects in images [19] , and even simple rotation and translation [16] . This phenomenon was first discovered by Szegedy et al. [48] in image classification problems, and similar phenomena have been observed in other areas [13, 30] . Adversarial examples bring serious challenges in many security-critical applications, such as medical diagnosis and autonomous driving-the existence of these examples shows that many state-of-the-art machine learning models are actually unreliable in the presence of adversarial attacks.
Since the discovery of adversarial examples, there has been a race between designing robust models that can defend against adversarial attacks and designing attack algorithms that can generate adversarial examples and fool the machine learning models [22, 24, 11, 12] . As of now, it seems that the attackers are winning this game. For example, a recent work shows that many of the defense algorithms fail when the attacker uses a carefully designed gradient-based method [3] . Meanwhile, adversarial training [26, 44, 35] seems to be the most effective defense method. Adversarial training takes a robust optimization [9] perspective to the problem, and the basic idea is to minimize some adversarial loss over the training data. We elaborate below.
Suppose that data points (x, y) are drawn according to some unknown distribution D over the feature-label space X ×Y, and X ⊆ R d . Let F be a hypothesis class (e.g., a class of neural networks with a particular architecture), and ℓ(f (x), y) be the loss associated with f ∈ F . Consider the ℓ ∞ white-box adversarial attack where an adversary is allowed to observe the trained model and choose some x ′ such that x ′ − x ∞ ≤ ǫ and ℓ(f (x ′ ), y) is maximized. Therefore, to better defend against adversarial attacks, during training, the learner should aim to solve the empirical adversarial risk minimization problem
where {(x i , y i )} n i=1 are n i.i.d. training examples drawn according to D. This minimax formulation raises many interesting theoretical and practical questions. For example, we need to understand how to efficiently solve the optimization problem in (1) , and in addition, we need to characterize the generalization property of the adversarial risk, i.e., the gap between the empirical adversarial risk in (1) and the population adversarial risk E (x,y)∼D [max x ′ −x ∞≤ǫ ℓ(f (x ′ ), y)]. In fact, for deep neural networks, both questions are still wide open. More specifically, the inner maximization problem in (1) is usually non-concave, and thus it is hard to obtain convergence guarantees. Moreover, it has been observed that even if we can minimize the adversarial training error, the adversarial test error can still be large. For example, for a Resnet [25] model on CIFAR10, using the PGD adversarial training algorithm in [35] , one can achieve about 96% adversarial training accuracy, but the adversarial test accuracy is only 47%. This generalization gap is significantly larger than that in the natural setting (without adversarial attacks), and thus it has become increasingly important to better understand the generalization behavior of machine learning models in the adversarial setting.
In this paper, we focus on the adversarially robust generalization property and make a first step towards deeper understanding of this problem. We focus on ℓ ∞ adversarial attacks and analyze generalization through the lens of Rademacher complexity. We study both linear classifiers and feedforward neural networks, and both binary and multi-class classification problems. We summarize our contributions as follows.
Our Contributions
• For binary linear classifiers, we prove tight upper and lower bounds for the Rademacher complexity of the adversarial loss function class. We show that the Rademacher complexity in the adversarial setting is never smaller than that in the natural setting, which provides theoretical evidence for the empirical observation that adversarially robust generalization can be hard. We also show that under an ℓ ∞ adversarial attack, a polynomial dimension dependence in the Rademacher complexity is unavoidable, unless the weight vector has bounded ℓ 1 norm. For multi-class linear classifiers, we prove margin bounds in the adversarial setting. Similar to binary classifiers, the margin bound also exhibits polynomial dimension dependence, unless the weight vector for each class has bounded ℓ 1 norm.
• For neural networks, we show that in contrast to the margin bound derived in [7] which depends only on the norms of the weight matrices and the data points, the Rademacher complexity of the adversarial loss function class has a lower bound with an explicit dimension dependence, which is also an effect of the ℓ ∞ attack. We further consider a surrogate adversarial loss for one hidden layer ReLU networks, based on the SDP relaxation proposed in [42] . We prove margin bounds using the surrogate loss and show that if the weight matrix of the first layer has bounded ℓ 1 norm, the margin bound does not have explicit dimension dependence. This suggests that in the adversarial setting, constraining the ℓ 1 norm of the weight matrices may be a way to improve generalization.
Notation
For an integer N > 0, we define the set [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N }. For two sets A and B, we denote by B A the set of all functions from A to B. We denote the indicator function of a event A as 1(A). Unless otherwise stated, we denote vectors by boldface lowercase letters such as w, and the elements in the vector are denoted by italics letters with subscripts, such as w k . Allone vectors are denoted by 1. Matrices are denoted by boldface uppercase letters such as W.
For matrices, we also use the shorthand notation · p ≡ · p,p . We denote the spectral norm of matrices by · σ and the Frobenius norm of matrices by · F (i.e., · F ≡ · 2 ). We use
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we discuss related work; in Section 3, we describe the formal problem setup; we present our main results for linear classifiers and neural networks in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, and make conclusions in Section 6.
Related Work
During the preparation of the initial draft of this paper, we become aware of another independent and concurrent work by Khim and Loh [27] , which studies a similar problem. In this section, we first compare our work with [27] and then discuss other related work. We compare our work with [27] in the following aspects.
• For binary classification problems, the adversarial Rademacher complexity upper bound in [27] is similar to ours. However, we provide an adversarial Rademacher complexity lower bound that matches the upper bound. Our lower bound shows that the adversarial Rademacher complexity is never smaller than that in the natural setting, indicating the hardness of adversarially robust generalization. We argue that although our lower bound is for Rademacher complexity rather than generalization, Rademacher complexity is a tight bound for the rate of uniform convergence of a loss function class [28] and thus in many settings can be a tight bound for generalization. This lower bound analysis does not appear in [27] .
• For both linear classifiers and neural networks, we discuss the generalization bounds for the multi-class setting, whereas in [27] the authors focus only on binary classification.
• For neural networks, we provide a lower bound for the adversarial Rademacher complexity, showing the dimension dependence is unavoidable due to ℓ ∞ attack. This lower bound is not discussed in [27] .
• Both our work and [27] prove adversarial generalization bound using surrogate adversarial loss (upper bound for the actual adversarial loss). In [27] , the authors use a method called tree transform whereas we use the SDP relaxation proposed in [42] . These two approaches are based on different ideas and thus we believe that they are not directly comparable.
We proceed to discuss other related work.
Adversarially robust generalization As discussed in Section 1, it has been observed in [35] that there is a significant generalization gap in the adversarial setting. This generalization problem has been further discussed by Schmidt et al. in [43] , where the authors show that to correctly classify two separated d-dimensional spherical Gaussian distributions, in the natural setting one only needs O(1) training data, but in the adversarial setting one needs Θ( √ d) data. Getting distribution agnostic generalization bounds (also known as the PAC-learning framework) for the adversarial setting is proposed as an open problem in [43] . In a subsequent work [14] , Cullina et al. study PAC-learning guarantees for binary linear classifiers in the adversarial setting via VCdimension, and show that the VC-dimension does not increase in the presence of adversarial attacks. This result does not provide explanation to the empirically observed fact that generalization may be hard in the adversarial setting. In fact, it has been observed that although VC-dimension and Rademacher complexity can both provide valid generalization bounds, VC-dimension usually depends on the number of parameters in the model while Rademacher complexity usually depends on the norms of the weight matrices and data points, and can often provide tighter generalization bounds [6] . In [47] , the Suggala et al. discuss a similar notion of adversarial risk but do not prove explicit generalization bounds. In a more recent work [4] , Attias et al. prove adversarial generalization bounds in a setting where the number of potential adversarial perturbations is finite and the generalization bound depends linearly in the number of potential perturbations. In our setting with ℓ ∞ attack, however, the number of potential perturbations is infinite or at least exponential in the dimension. In [46] , Sinha et al. analyze the convergence and generalization of an adversarial training algorithm under a weaker model of adversarial attack. In earlier work, robust optimization has been studied in Lasso [51] and SVM [52] problems. In [53] , Xu and Mannor make the connection between algorithmic robustness and generalization property in the natural setting, whereas our work focus on generalization in the adversarial setting.
Provable defense against adversarial attacks Besides generalization property, another recent line of work aim to design provable defense against adversarial attacks. Two examples of provable defense are SDP relaxation [42] and LP relaxation [29] . The idea of these methods is to construct upper bounds of the adversarial risk that can be efficiently evaluated and optimized. The analyses of these algorithms usually focus on minimizing training error and do not have generalization guarantee. In this paper, we call these upper bounds of adversarial risk surrogate adversarial loss, and analyze their generalization property. Generalization of neural networks Generalization of neural networks has been an important topic, even in the natural setting where there is no adversary. The key challenge is to understand why deep neural networks can generalize to unseen data despite the high capacity of the model class. The problem has received attention since the early stage of neural network study [6, 1] . Recently in [54] , understanding generalization of deep nets is raised as an open problem since traditional techniques such as VC-dimension, Rademacher complexity, and algorithmic stability seem to provide vacuous generalization bounds. Progress has been made more recently. In particular, it has been shown that when properly normalized by the margin, using Rademacher complexity or PAC-Bayesian analysis, one can obtain generalization bounds that tend to match the experimental results [7, 40, 2, 21] . In addition, in this paper, we show that when the weight vectors or matrices have bounded ℓ 1 norm, there is no dimension dependence in the adversarial generalization bound. This result is consistent and related to several previous works such as [34, 38, 55 ].
Other theoretical analysis of adversarial examples

Problem Setup
We start with the general statistical learning framework. Let X and Y be the feature and label spaces, respectively, and suppose that there is an unknown distribution D over X × Y. In this paper, we assume that the feature space is a subset of the d dimensional Euclidean space, i.e., X ⊆ R d . Let F ⊆ V X be the hypothesis class that we use to make predictions, where V is another space that might be different from Y. Let ℓ : V × Y → [0, B] be the loss function.
Throughout this paper we assume that ℓ is bounded, i.e., B is a positive constant. In addition, we introduce the function class ℓ F ⊆ [0, B] X ×Y by composing the functions in F with ℓ(·, y), i.e.,
We consider the supervised learning setting where one has access to n i.i.d. training examples drawn according to D, denoted by (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . , (x n , y n ). A learning algorithm maps the n training examples to a hypothesis f ∈ F . In this paper, we are interested in the gap between the empirical risk R n (f ) := 1 n n i=1 ℓ(f (x i ), y i ) and the population risk R(f ), known as the generalization error.
Rademacher complexity [8] is one of the classic measures of generalization error. Here, we present its formal definition. For any function class H ⊆ R Z , given a sample S = {z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n } of size n, and empirical Rademacher complexity is defined as
where σ 1 , . . . , σ n are i.i.d. Rademacher random variables with P{σ i = 1} = P{σ i = −1} = 1 2 . In our learning problem, denote the training sample by S, i.e., S := {(x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . , (x n , y n )}. We then have the following theorem which connects the population and empirical risks via Rademacher complexity.
Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ, the following holds for all f ∈ F ,
As we can see, Rademacher complexity measures the rate that the empirical risk converges to the population risk uniformly across F .
The above discussions can be extended to the adversarial setting. In this paper, we consider the ℓ ∞ adversarial attack. In this setting, the learning algorithm still has access to n i.i.d. uncorrupted training examples drawn according to D. Once the learning procedure finishes, the output hypothesis f is revealed to an adversary. For any data point (x, y) drawn according to D, the adversary is allowed to perturb x within some ℓ ∞ ball to maximize the loss. In this setting, our goal is to minimize the adversarial population risk, i.e.,
and to do this, a natural way is to conduct adversarial training-minimizing the adversarial empirical risk
Let us define the adversarial loss
Since the range of ℓ(f (x), y) is still [0, B], we have the following direct corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ, the following holds for all f ∈ F ,
As we can see, the Rademacher complexity of the adversarial loss function class ℓ F , i.e., R S ( ℓ F ) is again the key quantity for the generalization ability of the learning problem. A natural problem of interest is to compare the Rademacher complexities in the natural and the adversarial settings, and this could give us insights on how the adversarial perturbation affects generalization.
Linear Classifiers
Binary Classification
We start with binary linear classifiers. In this setting, we define Y = {−1, +1}, and let the hypothesis class F ⊆ R X be a set of linear functions of x ∈ X . More specifically, we define f w (x) := w, x , and consider prediction vector w with ℓ p norm constraint (p ≥ 1), i.e.,
We conduct binary classification task using the sign of f w (x); more specifically, we assume that the loss function ℓ(f w (x), y) can be written as
is monotonically nonincreasing and L φ -Lipschitz. In fact, if φ(0) ≥ 1, we can obtain a bound on the classification error according to Theorem 1. That is, we have with probability at least 1 − δ, for all f w ∈ F ,
2n .
In addition, recall that according to the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction inequality [33] , we have
We proceed to consider the adversarial setting, where we have
Let us define the following function class F ⊆ R X ×{−1,+1} :
Again, we have R S ( ℓ F ) ≤ L φ R S ( F ). The following theorem provides a comparison between R S (F ) and R S ( F ).
Then, there exists a universal constant c ∈ (0, 1) such that
We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix A. We can see that the Rademacher complexity in the adversarial setting, i.e., R S ( F ) is always at least as large as the Rademacher complexity in the natural setting. This implies that generalization in the adversarial setting is at least as hard as that in the natural setting. In addition, since max{a, b} ≥ 1 2 (a + b), we have
Therefore, we have a tight bound for R S ( F ) up to a constant factor. Further, if p > 1 the Rademacher complexity in the adversarial setting has an unavoidable polynomial dimension dependence, i.e., R S ( F ) is always at least as large as O(ǫW d 1/q √ n ). On the other hand, one can easily show that in the natural setting,
, which implies that R S (F ) depends on the distribution of x i and the norm constraint W , but does not have an explicit dimension dependence. This means that R S ( F ) could be order-wise larger than R S (F ), depending on the distribution of the data. An interesting fact is that, if we have an ℓ 1 norm constraint on the prediction vector w, we can avoid the dimension dependence in R S ( F ).
Multi-class Classification
Margin Bounds for Multi-class Classification
We proceed to study multi-class linear classifiers. We start with the standard margin bound framework for multi-class classification. In K-class classification problems, we choose Y = [K], and the functions in the hypothesis class F map X to R K , i.e., F ⊆ (R K ) X . Intuitively, the k-th coordinate of f (x) is the score that f gives to the k-th class, and we make prediction by choosing the class with highest score. We define the margin operator M (z, y) : 
One can check that ℓ(f (x), y) satisfies the following property:
training examples, and define the function class
by combining (5) with Theorem 1, we can obtain the following corollary as the generalization bound in the multi-class setting. Corollary 2. Consider the above multi-class classification setting. For any fixed γ > 0, we have with probability at least 1 − δ, for all f ∈ F ,
In the adversarial setting, the adversary tries to maximize the loss ℓ(f (x), y) = φ γ (M (f (x), y)) around an ℓ ∞ ball centered at x. We have the adversarial loss ℓ(f (x), y) := max x ′ ∈B ∞ x (ǫ) ℓ(f (x ′ ), y), and the function class
. Then we can derive the following generalization bound in the adversarial setting. Corollary 3. Consider the above adversarial multi-class classification setting. For any fixed γ > 0, we have with probability at least 1 − δ, for all f ∈ F ,
Multi-class Linear Classifiers
We now focus on multi-class linear classifiers. For linear classifiers, each function in the hypothesis class is parametrized by a matrix W ∈ R K×d , i.e., f (
x . We assume that each w k has ℓ p norm (p ≥ 1) upper bounded by W , which implies that F = {f W (x) : W ⊤ p,∞ ≤ W }. In the natural setting, we have the following margin bound for linear classifiers as a corollary of the multi-class margin bounds in [32, 37] . Theorem 3. Consider the multi-class linear classifiers in the above setting, and suppose that 
We prove Theorem 3 in Appendix B.1 for completeness. In the adversarial setting, we have the following margin bound.
Theorem 4. Consider the multi-class linear classifiers in the adversarial setting, and suppose that
For any fixed γ > 0 and W > 0, we have with probability at least 1 − δ, for all W such that W ⊤ p,∞ ≤ W ,
We prove Theorem 4 in Appendix B.2. As we can see, when p > 1, the margin bound in the adversarial setting has explicit polynomial dependence on d, whereas in the natural setting, the margin bound does not have dimension dependence. This implies that the dimension dependence in the generalization bound in the adversarial setting may also exist in the multi-class setting.
Neural Networks
We proceed to consider feedforward neural networks with ReLU activation. More specifically, each function f in the hypothesis class F is parametrized by a sequence of matrices W = (W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W L ), i.e., f ≡ f W . Assume that W h ∈ R d h ×d h−1 , and ρ(·) be the ReLU function, i.e., ρ(t) = max{t, 0} for t ∈ R. For vectors, ρ(x) is vector generated by applying ρ(·) on each coordinate of x, i.e., [ρ(x)] i = ρ(x i ). We have f W (x) = W L ρ(W L−1 ρ(· · · ρ(W 1 x) · · · )). Thus, we have d 0 = d. For K-class classification, we have d L = K, f W (x) : R d → R K , and [f W (x)] k is the score for the k-th class. In the special case of binary classification, as discussed in Section 4.1, we can have Y = {+1, −1}, d L = 1, and the loss function can be written as
where φ : R → [0, B] is monotonically nonincreasing and L φ -Lipschitz.
Comparison of Rademacher Complexity Bounds
We start with a comparison of Rademacher complexities of neural networks in the natural and adversarial settings. As discussed in Section 2, although naively applying the definition of Rademacher complexity may provide a loose generalization bound, when properly normalized by the margin, one can still derive generalization bound that matches experimental observations via Rademacher complexity [7] . Our comparison shows that, when the weight matrices of the neural networks have bounded norms, in the natural setting, the Rademacher complexity is upper bounded by a quantity which only has logarithmic dependence on the dimension; however, in the adversarial setting, the Rademacher complexity is lower bounded by a quantity with explicit √ d dependence. We focus on the binary classification. In the natural setting, we review the results in [7] . Let S = {(x i , y i )} n i=1 ∈ (X × {−1, +1}) n be the i.i.d. training examples, and define X := [x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ] ∈ R d×n , and d max = max{d, d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d L }.
Theorem 5. [7] Consider the neural network hypothesis class
Then, we have
On the other hand, we have the following result which shows that when the product of the spectral norms of all the weight matrices is bounded, the Rademacher complexity of the adversarial loss function class is lower bounded by a quantity with √ d factor. More specifically, since we have
and φ(·) is Lipschitz, we consider the function class
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 6. Let F be defined as in (6) . Then, there exists a universal constant c > 0 such that
We prove Theorem 6 in Appendix C.1. This result shows that if we aim to study the Rademacher complexity of the function class defined as in (6), a √ d dimension dependence may be unavoidable, in contrast to the natural setting where the dimension dependence is only logarithmic.
Generalization Bound for Surrogate Adversarial Loss
For neural networks, even if there is only one hidden layer, for a particular data point (x, y), evaluating the adversarial loss ℓ(f W (x), y) = max x ′ ∈B ∞ x (ǫ) ℓ(f W (x ′ ), y) can hard, since it requires maximizing a non-concave function in a bounded set. A recent line of work tries to find upper bounds for ℓ(f W (x), y) that can be computed in polynomial time. More specifically, we would like to find surrogate adversarial loss ℓ(f W (x), y) such that ℓ(f W (x), y) ≥ ℓ(f W (x), y), ∀ x, y, W. These surrogate adversarial loss can thus provide certified defense against adversarial examples, and can be computed efficiently. In addition, the surrogate adversarial loss ℓ(f W (x), y) should be as tight as possible-it should be close enough to the original adversarial loss ℓ(f W (x), y), so that the surrogate adversarial loss can indeed represent the robustness of the model against adversarial attacks. In recent years, a few approaches to designing surrogate adversarial loss have been developed, and SDP relaxation [42] and LP relaxation [29] are two major examples.
In this section, we focus on the SDP relaxation for one hidden layer neural network with ReLU activation proposed in [42] . We prove a generalization bound regarding the surrogate adversarial loss, and show that this generalization bound does not have explicit dimension dependence if the weight matrix of the first layer has bounded ℓ 1 norm. We consider K-class classification problems in this section (i.e., Y = [K]), and start with the definition and property of the SDP surrogate loss. Since we only have one hidden layer, f W (x) = W 2 ρ(W 1 x). Let w 2,k be the k-th column of W ⊤ 2 . Then, we have the following results according to [42] . Theorem 7. [42] For any (x, y), W 1 , W 2 , and y ′ = y,
where Q(v, W) is defined as
Since we consider multi-class classification problems in this section, we use the ramp loss φ γ defined in (4) composed with the margin operator as our loss function. Thus, we have
Here, we design a surrogate loss ℓ(f W (x), y) based on Theorem 7.
Then, we have max
With this surrogate adversarial loss in hand, we can develop the following margin bound for adversarial generalization. In this theorem, we use X = [x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ] ∈ R d×n , and d max = max{d, d 1 , K}.
Theorem 8. Consider the neural network hypothesis class
Then, for any fixed γ > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have for all f W (·) ∈ F ,
We prove Theorem 8 in Appendix C.3. Similar to the linear classifiers, in the adversarial setting, if we have an ℓ 1 norm constraint on the matrix matrix W 1 , then the generalization bound of the surrogate adversarial loss does not have an explicit dimension dependence.
Conclusions
We study the adversarially robust generalization properties of linear classifiers and neural networks through the lens of Rademacher complexity. For binary linear classifiers, we prove tight bounds for the adversarial Rademacher complexity, and show that in the adversarial setting, Rademacher complexity is never smaller than that in the natural setting, and it has an unavoidable dimension dependence, unless the weight vector has bounded ℓ 1 norm. The results also extends to multi-class linear classifiers. For neural networks, we prove a lower bound of the Rademacher complexity of the adversarial loss function class and show that there is also an unavoidable dimension dependence due to ℓ ∞ adversarial attack. We further consider a surrogate adversarial loss and prove margin bound for this setting. Our results indicate that having ℓ 1 norm constraints on the weight matrices might be a potential way to improve generalization in the adversarial setting.
A Proof of Theorem 2
First, we have
We then analyze R S ( F ). Define f w (x, y) := min x ′ ∈B ∞ x (ǫ) y w, x ′ . Then, we have
When y = 1, we have
Similarly, when y = −1, we have
Thus, we conclude that f w (x, y) = y w, x − ǫ w 1 , and therefore
Since the supremum of w, u − v w 1 over w can only be achieved when sgn(w i ) = sgn(u i ), we know that
Now we prove an upper bound for R S ( F ). By triangle inequality, we have
where the last step is due to Khintchine's inequality.
We then proceed to prove a lower bound for R S ( F ). According to (9) and by symmetry, we know that
Then, combining (9) and (10) and using triangle inequality, we have
Similarly, we have
By Khintchine's inequality, we know that there exists a universal constant c > 0 such that
√ n . Combining with (11), we complete the proof.
B Multi-class Linear Classifiers
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
According to the multi-class margin bound in [32] , for any fixed γ, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
In the special case of linear classifiers F = {f W (x) : W ⊤ p,∞ ≤ W }, we can see that
Thus, we have
which completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Since the loss function in the adversarial setting is y) ).
Since we consider linear classifiers, we have min
Define h (k)
To see this, we can see that according to (12) ,
W (x, y)) = 0. Therefore, we can see that (13) 
We proceed to analyze R S (F k ). The basic idea is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. We define u y = n i=1 σ i x i 1(y i = y) and v y = n i=1 σ i 1(y i = y). Then, we have where the last equality is due to the same derivation as in the proof of Theorem 2. Let n y = n i=1 1(y i = y). Then, we apply triangle inequality and Khintchine's inequality and obtain
Combining with (14), we obtain
where the last step is due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
C Neural Network
C.1 Proof of Theorem 6
We first review a Rademacher complexity lower bound in [7] . According to Lemma 2, in the adversarial setting, by defining
y w, x ′ : w 2 ≤ r 2 } ⊆ R X ×{−1,+1} , we have F ′ ⊆ F . Therefore, there exists a universal constant c > 0 such that
where the last inequality is due to Theorem 2.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Since Q(·, ·) is a linear function in its first argument, we have for any y, y ′ ∈ [K], max P 0,diag(P)≤1 Q(w 2,y ′ − w 2,y , W 1 ), P ≤ max P 0,diag(P)≤1 Q(w 2,y ′ , W 1 ), P + max zQ(w 2,k , W 1 ), P .
Then, for any (x, y), we have max x ′ ∈B ∞ x (ǫ) 1(y = arg max where the first inequality is due to the property of ramp loss, the second inequality is by the definition of the margin, the third inequality is due to Theorem 7, the fourth inequality is due to (15) , the fifth inequality is by the definition of the margin and the last inequality is due to the property of ramp loss.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 8
We study the Rademacher complexity of the function class where we use the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction inequality and the convexity of the supreme operation. For the first term, since we have W 1 1 ≤ b 1 , we have W ⊤ 1 2,1 ≤ b 1 . Then, we can apply the Rademacher complexity bound in [7] and obtain R S (M F ) ≤ 4 n 3/2 + 60 log(n) log(2d max ) n s 1 s 2 ( b 1 s 1
Now consider the second term in (16) . According to [42] , we always have max P 0,diag(P)≤1 zQ(w 2,k , W 1 ), P ≥ 0.
In addition, we know that when P 0 and diag(P) ≤ 1, we have
Moreover, we have
Then, we obtain
